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The narrow and probabilistic, ergodic approach to risk, to date, has potentially not fully understood or 
incorporated the dynamical synthetic ecology in which our systems actually operate. A dynamic 
synthetic ecology made even more complex and potentially uncertain and unstable through the 
degrees of socio-info/techno connectivity we now enjoy compared to 30 years ago. This means our 
decisions and solutions are often deeply entangled in ways that it is almost impossible to measure. Yet 
Risk Management continues to call for measured certainty based upon a potentially increasingly 
narrow and frozen understanding of Risk – usually ‘taken’ at the unit / operational but not the systems 
level. In this paper, we look at uncertainty and instability as being connected but not necessarily 
synonymous indicators of risk. In terms of instability, we look to classify different types of instability 
that a system may face including, for example, technical risks introduced through disruptive 
technologies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fire scientists and managers recognized that fire-adapted ecosystems had been 
harmed by overzealous suppression, that growing fuel loads were exacerbating 
wildfire problems, and that restoring natural fire regimes should be a priority in fire 
management policy and practice. Nonetheless, despite changes in agency rhetoric 
and fire management policy over the last several decades, fire suppression 
continues to be reinforced through incentive structures, agency budgets, and 
professional practice (Arno and Allison-Bunnell 2002). Instead of making ecological 
restoration the core of fire management practice, land management agencies are 
devoting ever greater resources to suppressing fires that continue to grow in extent 
and intensity (Butler and Goldstein, 2010). 
 
In this paper, we consider classification and ecological [system] identification (what are the systems 
we are looking at?) as being essential precursors to making and taking robust decisions regarding 
Risk, its measurement, instrumentation and management. Instabilities can lead to uncertainty – 
sometimes through shocks to the system, for example a Physical Instability such as an earth quake or 
Tsunami. These more Complex Instabilities (connecting a Tsunami with the siting of a Nuclear Power 
Reactor for example) need to be understood and factored into any adequate measurements of risk, so 
that the uncertainties (in any measure of risk) can be properly and adequately understood. This, in 
itself, provides for a more dynamical and resilient understanding of risk than potentially has been the 
case hitherto – and so may act as an aid to improved decision making and taking. 
 From classification and identification of the systems we are seeking to address we consider how, 
rather than measuring and metricating risk as a static singular No., we may instrument risk and devise 
models that can provide a dynamical (non-ergodic) and non-obtrusive means of assessing risk. By 
instrument, we mean creating network models of the system that can act like a petrol gauge in a car, 
to give managers good indicators and warnings of system health and therefore its ability to identify 
and manage risks over time, not simply in time, in which we consider, after ATL (2007); Ford et al 
(2009) and Reay Atkinson (2011a), instrumentation to be: 
 
‘The ontological modelling of dynamic system ecologies so as to identify what has occurred at 
different combinations and scales in order to synthesise, analyse, influence and / or control 
future socio-info/techno and info/techno-socio phenomenon, strategies and processes’ 
 
The instruments we propose are Dynamic social Networks (DsN) (Uddin et al, 2012) that represent a 
model – imperfect as it may be – of the socio-info/techno (Reay Atkinson et al, 2012) and info/techno-
socio (Reay Atkinson et al, 2011b) systems we are often addressing, be they in the physical or cyber / 
virtual worlds in which increasingly we work, design, engineer and solve more complex problems. We 
also distinguish between decision making and decision taking (DMT) (Reay Atkinson et al, 2014b) and 
consider an alternative model for dynamically arriving at decisions that differentiates between strong 
control type signals and the weaker social signals of innovation, change and adaptation (Ansoff, 1975; 
Coffman, 1997; Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 1999; Hiltunen, 2010; Hiltunen, 2008). Weaker signals 
often drowned out by the control measures put in place to minimise risk (Reay Atkinson, 2011a)! 
Instrumentation may also allow a company or organisation to understand the impact of uncertainty and 
instability on risk and so guide, steer or influence the organisation towards alternative equilibriums.  
 
In this paper, we first introduce the concepts of instability and uncertainty we will be examining. We 
then develop the concepts for the synthetic ecology, as applied to political, economic assurance and 
instability models.  We then suggest how these concepts and models may and will be applied as part 
of a wider informal investigation into the Blue Mountains Region in support of the Blue Mountains City 
Council, the people it represents and the wider region. 
2. SYNTHETIC ECOLOGY AND IDENTIFICATION 
‘In 1770 Lieutenant James Cook, HMS Endeavour, saw something remarkable 
along Australia’s east coast: the trees had “no underwood”. On 1 May he “made an 
excursion into the country which we found diversified with woods, lawns and 
marshes; the woods are free from underwood of every kind and the trees are at 
such a distance from one another that the whole country or at least a great part of it 
might be cultivated without being obliged to cut down a single tree”.’ James Cook 
quoted in Bill Gammage (2011). 
 
Bill Gammage’s point is that in 1788, when British and European settlers first colonised Australia, 
there existed a synthetic ecology adapted to fire and managed accordingly, where we consider a 
synthetic ecology to be: 
 
‘a system (being or entity) that adapts, over time, by combining, through design 
and by natural processes, two or more dynamically interacting networks, including 
organisms, the communities they make up, and the non-living (physical and 
technological) mechanical components of their environment’ (Reay Atkinson et al, 
2014a). 
 
Similarly, the Pacific Biodiversity Institute
1
 considers a Fire Ecology to be: 
 
‘A branch of ecology that focuses on the origins of wild-land fire and it’s relationship 
to the environment that surrounds it, both living and non-living’. 
 
Today, ‘the parks have gone…1788’s controlled fire [undertaken by Aboriginal / Indigenous peoples] 
stopped when Europeans arrived. Today’s bushfires devastate, and decimate species which 
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 http://www.pacificbio.org/initiatives/fire/fire_ecology.html 
 flourished during millennia of Aboriginal burning. In heath near Kiama (NSW), ground parrots needed 
fire every 3–7 years to balance food and shelter. In 1788 they got this, but after 1788 they got 
infrequent hot fires, and by 1968 had died out. …since 1788 at least 23 mammal species have 
become extinct, and since about 1940 almost a third of world mammal extinctions have been in 
Australia. Recognising how extensive such changes have been, to plants, animals and the land, is 
crucial to understanding how constant and purposeful 1788 management was’ (Gammage, 2011). 
 
In our research, we consider the Fire Ecology to be one part of the Synthetic Ecology that represents 
the ‘Blue Mountains Region’ (or Greater Blue Mountains Area) that forms the basis of this paper and 
its area of research. We use, by way of example, research
2
 currently being undertaken (March-July 
2014) by undergraduate students taking the ENGG 3853 Risk Management Tools and Techniques 
course at the University of Sydney. The second half of the course involves the students researching 
and developing an Ecological Fire Risk Register of the Blue Mountains. The study is based on the 
fires that occurred in the region of the Blue Mountains from 17 to 28 October 2013. The area called 
the ‘Blue Mountains Region’ is called so because, as temperatures rise, the oils of the different 
Eucalyptus species evaporate to create an aerosol haze or mist that appears blue to human eyes. It is 
also these oils contained within eucalyptus that create the fire ecology of the region and the 
Flammable Ecosystems identified by Bond and Keeley (2005) to include boreal forests, eucalyptus 
woodlands, shrub lands, grasslands and savannas. 
 
The Blue Mountains National Park constitutes one part of the area traditionally considered as 
belonging to the ‘Blue Mountains Region’ and including also the Kanangra-Boyd, Wollemi and Nattai 
National Parks, see Figure 1. As seen by Figures 1 and 2, reproduced from Google Maps, the fires 
occurred both inside and outside the Blue Mountains National Park and the wider Blue Mountains 
Region, somewhat adding to the perceptual confusion at the time and during recovery. Considering 
the roughly 44,500 square kilometres / 4.45 Mega Hectares (MHa) – or 16,864 square miles / 10.9 
Million Acres – shown by Figure 1, about 2 MHa (45%) is forested / National Park of which 
approximately one third (0.7 MHa / 15% of the Map) constitutes the Blue Mountains Region, see Table 
1. Put in perspective, the area covered by the map shown in Figure 1 is over twice the size of Wales 
and the forested / rural areas are about the same size as Belgium.  
 
 
Figure 1 – (LHS) Map of the Region showing major seats of Fire (Map Data @ 2014 Google) 
Figure 2 – (RHS) System Ecological Map of the Region showing National Parks / Forested; Urban and 
Rural / Agricultural Areas in addition to the Blue Mountains City Council.  
 
From the main seats of the fires, shown in Figure 1, it will be seen that while two fires were within the 
Blue Mountains National Park; one was in the Wollemi National Park and three were in the Penrith 
region. Similarly, three of the fires were within the area covered by the Blue Mountains City Council, 
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 This is a new concept for research as part of a course and undertaken at the undergraduate level – taking research into the 
wider ecology and considering it as a dynamic. 
 two of them were in adjacent urban council areas and one was outside both the Blue Mountain Region 
and City Council. Yet the perception from news coverage of the event was that the Blue Mountains, as 
a whole, were ‘up in flames’ and, consequently, ‘not open for business’. Although important for 
minimising traffic to the fires (and so-called disaster tourism), it was a bit like closing the countries of 
Wales or Belgium as a result of five or six relatively well identified and located fires! As a result, the 
economy of the whole region suffered as bonified tourists stopped coming. 
 
Table 1 Synthetic Ecology of the Blue Mountains-Sydney Region 
 
Physical-Socio Ecology Approx. Area 
(MHa) 
Approx. % 
Maritime / Rivers / Lakes 0.9 20% 
Urban 0.45 10% 
Forested / National Parks 
(Blue Mountains Region) 
(Blue Mountains National 
Park) 
2.0 
(0.7) 
(0.27) 
45% 
(15%) 
(6%) 
(Blue Mountains City 
Council) 
(0.143) (3.2%) 
Rural / Agricultural 1.1 25% 
 4.45MHa  
 
Note 1: The Blue Mountains National Park, itself, covers about .27 MHa (6% of the Map); whereas the 
‘Blue Mountains Region’, identified above, incorporates other adjacent National Parks to describe the 
area as a whole. 
 
Note 2: The Blue Mountains City Council incorporates parts of the Blue Mountains National Park and 
essentially runs East-West along the famous vehicular routes that first opened up the hinterland of 
New South Wales to European settlers, early in the 19
th
 Century. 
3. UNCERTAINTIES AND INSTABILITIES: PREVENTION & RECOVERY  
In this paper we consider Instability to be ‘the quality or state of being unstable and / or the tendency 
to behave in an unpredictable, changeable, or erratic manner’. We further suggest that there are four 
different classes of instability that need to be understood when managing risk and which we consider 
to be the Physical, Human, Technological and Complex: 
 
 Physical: e.g. fire, earthquake, tsunami; 
 Human: e.g. war, politics, Global Financial Crisis; famine, social change etc; 
 Technological: e.g. Cyber, ICT and, potentially disruptive technologies such as 
nanotechnology; 
 Complex: some combination of Physical; Human, Social or Technological,(socio-info/techno 
or info/techno-socio) e.g. Morwell town disabled by the Brown Coal Fire. 
 
Situating ‘risk’ in terms of an economy is clearly an imperative as has been seen when recovering 
shattered countries such as in Bosnia or Sierra-Leone. If people do not feel secure and safe – assured 
– they will not invest their time in the local ecology and will endeavour, naturally, to go somewhere 
else where they may be rewarded, see Gilpin (2000). We conclude, therefore, that the same applies to 
recovering local economies and regions from physical / human instabilities such as fire. ‘Decision 
making and taking can be considered as the political element necessary to create the context in which 
decisions can be taken: politicking’ (Reay Atkinson et al, 2011c, 2012, 2014b). This was coupled to 
the economy by Keohane and Nye (1972) who considered the ‘Political Economy’ and then extended 
to the ‘International Political Economy (IPE)’ by Gilpin (2000). Rather than the IPE, the more coupled 
Political Sûréte
3
  Economy (PŜE) acting at both a Global and Local (glocal) levels or GPŜE
4
 
(pronounced gypsy) is suggested.  
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Encompassing safety, security, assuredness (including insurance) and trust. 
 In this paper we consider the Freedman-Morgan
5
 (Freedman, 2009) understanding of ‘Prevent’ being 
about preventing a hostile act / damaging event in the first instance through all other means short of 
the use of force, including the use of meaningful inducements and encouragement (influence, policies, 
laws and rules). Our model considers the management of three phases: Prevention; Engagement and 
Recovery (PER). Other four stage models exist, including Mitigate, Preparedness, Response & 
Recovery (MPRR) and Prevent, Prepare, Respond & Recover (P2R2). However, we consider that 
engagement incorporate response and that mitigation and preparedness are elements of recovery and 
prevention. Moreover, we also suggest that the ability to prevent, engage and recover is indicative of 
resilience, where we see: ‘Resilience to be the ability of the system to transform, renew, and recover in 
a timely response to events’ (Bryant, 2012). The aim of the PER Model is to move agents as quickly 
towards the Recovery phase as is possible, ideally without having to enforce and / or enact new laws. 
Yet having formal enforcement and legislative bodies available as an option to enable the recovery 
and prevention processes.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Prevent-Engage-Recover Model – ‘The Rose Bowl’ (Hemlock, 2012) 
 
The Prevent-Engage
6
 -Recover model, Figure 3, is not exhaustive and considers political options 
relating more to defence and security. It attempts to identify alternative connected-strategies that 
might be available to diffuse complex situations. There is no ‘one size fits all but there are elements 
within the model that may be applied to recovery from complex instabilities. Specifically, the PER 
model recognises work by Gray (2003) and Luttwak (2001) ‘that placed emphasis on the importance 
of strategic culture in networked social processes and which underpin planning, decision-making and 
so decision-taking: good decisions are not capability driven’ (Reay Atkinson and Goodman, 2008). 
Frequently we are presented with situations where decisions need to be taken and yet when there is 
uncertainty as to how best to proceed. In other words, there is more than one solution and we are 
dealing, potentially, with a complex problem. Uncertainty applies to probabilities, as in a Risk Register 
and to physical measurements that are already made, or to known-unknowns, unknown-knowns and 
unknown-unknowns. Specifically, we consider uncertainty to ‘arise in partially observable, opaque, 
stochastic environments / non-ergodic (complex) ecologies, overly prescribed, ruled or controlled 
regimes as well as due to ignorance and / or lack of caring and shared awareness (or indolence)’: 
 
In the formulation of a traditional Performance Assessment System (PAS) in the 
Occupational Health & Safety (OHS) area, most Performance Indicators (PIs) are 
affected by non-probabilistic uncertainty like the imprecision, the indefiniteness or 
the ambiguity, however, they are usually represented by deterministic values. This 
is mainly due to the inability of current PASs to adequately represent this kind of 
uncertainty. It is considered, however, that a good PAS must be able to deal with 
the uncertainty since this uncertainty is part of the models used to obtain the PIs 
and also part of data that support them. Generally, each PI is represented by a 
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Ascribed to Dr Jamie MacIntosh and Dr Simon Reay Atkinson, Advanced Research Assessment Group (ARAG), UK Defence 
Academy, 2007. ARAG is under Hansard’s Parliamentary record as being the only UK Public organisation to have identified the 
potential of the Global Financial Crisis; its depth and duration some years beforehand. 
5
Distinction credited to P.M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977, ch. 2. 
6
This model, considered during the UK Strategic Security and Defence Review (SDSR) is implicitly referred to by General Sir 
David Richards, then Chief of General Staff in his letter to all [British] Army Commanding Officers, dated 29 Oct 09, in which he 
states inter-alia : ‘Prevention will be a key element of British foreign policy in the years ahead and we in the Army will have a 
critical role to play in this.  Whether we are training indigenous security forces to build their capacity to cope with violence and 
terrorism overseas or merely reassuring our allies that we are there to support them, we must be prepared to be deployed and 
engaged in prevention operations across the globe’. 
 number that is not able to represent uncertainty. The problem is how to overcome 
this situation or how to deal with data uncertainty (Cavallare, 2013). 
 
According to Lopes et al. (2013), the performance measurement (PM) process, involves three different 
activities: measurement, data record/transmission and performance measure determination. Each of 
these three activities can be made automatically (for example by a computer application), it can be 
made manually (i.e. it may depend on human tasks), or it may be a combination of both. All these 
activities can influence the results or values of any PM. Thus an unknown error or uncertainty is 
present in any PM (Sousa et al., 2013). This uncertainty can be induced by several factors (Lopes et 
al, 2013), some of which are described in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Some Causes or Sources of Uncertainty in the Performance Measurement of Risk during the 
Prevention, Engagement and Recovery Phases, from (Sousa et al., 2013)  
 
Phase Factor Description 
Prevention 
Physical Changes to Vegetation 
Human Changing Land Use, Human Error, 
Politicking 
Technological Building Types 
Complex Climate Change, extreme weather  
Engagement 
with Fire 
Physical Communication Routes 
Human Formal-Informal Networks (Federal 
State / Council / Rural Fire Service) 
Operational Response Time 
Technological Media & Medium (IT, Cyber 
Communications, Twitter etc.)  
Complex Safe Messaging, Water Availability 
Recovery 
Physical Location / Extent of Damage 
Human Rules, Regulations, Insurance, 
Politics, Lack of Competencies, 
Health, Knowledge Networks 
Technological Building Designs & Classes 
Complex Governance, Political Layers 
 
To support this classification and systems analysis,  we will apply ‘cause-and-effect, Ishikawa or 
fishbone diagrams’ developed in 1950 by the late Professor Kaoru Ishikawa, ‘with a force-field 
analysis’ to provide ‘a diagram combining the restraining and driving forces…to assist in [system] 
diagnosis’ (Juran and Godfrey, 1999). 
4. HIC SUNT DRACONES (HERE BE DRAGONS) 
The dragon-crocodile
7
 possessed fire sticks. The rainbow bird would ask for fire, 
but was knocked back every time. The dragon had fire. No man made it. The 
dragon had had fire from a long time ago. Then the rainbow bird took the fire and 
put it everywhere. Every tree has fire inside now (Isaacs, 1980). 
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 The Dream Time Story is of the crocodile itself a form of ‘terrible lizard’ or dinosaur which we might, in this regard, think of as 
the dragon in European or Chinese mythology. This story is paraphrased from Jennifer Isaacs (1980) compilation of stories 
under the title ‘Crocodile took the Firestick’, see also Fire and Rescue NSW, http://www.fire.nsw.gov.au/page.php?id=647 
visited February 2014 
 We may, in some respects, be better thinking of the ecology of the region in terms not simply of its 
blue azure but also in terms of fire. Rather than simply being the Blue Mountains, the region might 
also be described as the ‘Blue Dragon Mountains’ (montes puteulanus dracones). The Blue Mountains 
ecology represents an ecosystem composed of dynamically interacting networks, hence our work to 
create a dynamical ecological fire risk register. The output will be a register designed and intended to 
scope these interacting organisms, and communities and their associated physical and technological 
networks and to provide an instrument for assessing them and thereby the future resilience of the 
region as a whole to cope with fire, recover from fire and prevent the excesses of fire in the future.  
 
To undertake this research, we intend to take a systems level approach, looking at the whole ecology 
(of the Blue Mountains) and identifying the different types of networks interacting within it. This leads 
to System Classification, necessary as a first step to identifying the types of tools and techniques one 
will apply to manage the whole system. We have begun this process by developing some of the 
classifications in terms of instabilities and uncertainties we will be seeking to identify (assess and 
measure) as part of our research.  
 
Building on the identified causes or sources of uncertainty, we intend to quantify them in different 
means for example applying probability or fuzzy theories to deal with subjectivity and Likert-type 
scales to allow experts or users to express their degree of importance/agreement of a given subject’ 
(Sousa et al., 2013). We intend then, by applying graph theory showing interconnected uncertainty 
sources and their dependencies, to convert this into a matrix. From this matrix, we can then develop 
individual levels of uncertainty about particular identified risks to the Blue Mountains Ecology. Our 
intention is to create a dynamic risk register and one that we can instrument – and so to show 
changing levels of risks and the uncertainties associated with their measurements. From these 
uncertainties, we can then examine reasons for them and potentially advise on actions that are 
increasing uncertainties – for example climate change leading to reduced opportunities for back 
burning leading to increased growth and fuel for fires – and so instrument the ecology.  
 
Our aim is to create an instrument that enables us to better manage in particular the recovery and 
prevention phases so as to improve the resilience of the region as a whole and its ability to engage 
and recover from fires. Such an instrument would be an aid to better management – but may have 
considerable impact upon future governance arrangements and the way we do our business and 
politics. In other words, the instrument itself and the potential opportunities for industry it creates may 
enable a resilient future Knowledge Enterprise Economy (KEE) and export opportunities on a national 
and regional basis. 
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